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Panarchy and the Law
J. B. Ruhl 1
ABSTRACT. Panarchy theory focuses on improving theories of change in natural and social systems to improve the design of
policy responses. Its central thesis is that successfully working with the dynamic forces of complex adaptive natural and social
systems demands an active adaptive management regime that eschews optimization approaches that seek stability. This is a new
approach to resources management, and yet no new theory of how to do things in environmental and natural resources
management, particularly one challenging entrenched ways of doing things and the interests aligned around them, is likely to
gain traction in practice if it cannot gain traction in the form of endorsement and implementation through specific laws and
regulations. At some point, that bridge must be crossed or the enterprise of putting panarchy theory into panarchy practice will
stall. Any effort to operationalize panarchy theory through law thus comes up against the mission of law to provide social stability
and the nature of law itself as a complex adaptive system. To state the problem in another way, putting panarchy theory into
practice will require adaptively managing the complex adaptive legal system to adaptively manage other complex adaptive
natural and social systems, all in a way that maintains some level of social order. Panarchy theorists have yet to develop an
agenda for doing so. It is time for lawyers to join the team.
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INTRODUCTION
In Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and
Natural Systems, editors Lance Gunderson and C. S. Holling
(2002) assemble a collection of fascinating discussions of an
elaborate but ultimately compelling theory of natural and
social system dynamics. The central objective of the book is
to “develop an integrative theory to help us understand the
changes occurring globally...particularly the kind of changes
that are transforming, in systems that are adaptive” (Holling
et al. 2002:5). Any such theory, they contend, “must of
necessity transcend the boundaries of scale and
discipline...[and] be capable of organizing our understanding
of economic, ecological, and institutional systems” (Holling
et al. 2002:5). They coined the name “panarchy” for their
theory, after the flutist and Greek god of nature, Pan, to position
it “as an antithesis to the word hierarchy” and to capture its
“cross-scale, interdisciplinary, and dynamic nature” (Holling
et al. 2002:21,5).
The contributions in Panarchy, however, purported to offer
far more than just an abstract theory of system organization
and evolution. The central thesis of Panarchy is that policy
responses to declines in environmental quality and the growing
scale of human activities have often been “flawed because the
theories of change underlying them are inadequate,” and that
as a result, “the ultimate pathology of...traditional resources
exploitation and management...is to create less resilient
ecosystems, more rigid institutions, and deeper social
dependencies” (Gunderson and Holling 2002:xxi–xxii).
Improving theories of change in natural and social systems to
improve design of policy responses is thus one of the
motivating forces of the book. Panarchy offers the new theory
of change, from which the book’s contributors argue that
1
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“precautionary policies” and “adaptive management” are
necessary and vitally important policy structures (Gunderson
et al. 2002, Holling et al. 2002, Janssen 2002, Walker and Abel
2002, Westley et al. 2002).
This dimension of Panarchy raised a question that lingers a
decade later: Is it really possible to translate the theory of
panarchy into law, that is, into concrete legal text of the kind
legislatures write, agencies enforce, and courts interpret?
From theory to policy to law can be quite a long distance and
the difficulty of the terrain easily underestimated. It is not easy
to make law, much less law that hews closely to a theoretical
ideal. For example, a legislature could not simply codify the
pages of Panarchy verbatim, call that law, and command
agencies and courts to make it so. In a civil society at least,
law has to be reasonably clear, enforceable, and it has to enjoy
legitimacy (Bodansky 1999, Esty 2006). How are the
elaborate, dense, technical, nuanced systems theories
developed in Panarchy, which many of the contributing
authors suggest point strongly in particular policy directions,
to be translated into text that meets these and the other essential
qualities of law?
Panarchy offers no clues in this regard. The book leaves law
and the legal discipline out of the interdisciplinary theme of
panarchy theory. None of the book’s contributing authors is
formally trained in the law. Indeed, notwithstanding hundreds
of claims throughout the chapters about the importance of
policy and institutional reform, the law is scarcely mentioned
anywhere in the book. One chapter briefly discusses laws as
being an ingredient of the institutional component of complex
ecological-economic systems (Janssen 2002), and another
touches on the importance of property rights to the economics
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of resilience and sustainability (Brock et al. 2002). But that is
it as far as law goes in Panarchy. Even the case study chapters
on fisheries (Carpenter et al. 2002), rangelands (Walker and
Abel 2002), and the Everglades (Gunderson et al. 2002) omit
references to legal context, notwithstanding that each of those
policy realms is knee deep in the governing legal text of
statutes and agency regulations. Similarly, scarce mention of
law can be found in the literature developing the theory of
panarchy since the book’s publication (but see Holling 2005),
and few legal scholars have carried the theory into their work
(but see Karkkainen 2005, Garmestani et al. 2008, Ruhl 2011,
Cosens 2012). Why is there this failure to connect panarchy
theory with the law?
To be fair, none of the editors or authors of Panarchy purported
for their work to direct how law should be shaped and written.
However, at some point, that bridge must be crossed or the
enterprise of putting panarchy theory into panarchy practice
will stall. Informal social norms, as powerful as they may be,
would be insufficient to take on challenges as complex as
management of fisheries, rangelands, wetlands, and other
natural resource management questions facing the nations
around the world. Even official policy proclamations cannot
do the work of hard law to apply. Famously, for example, the
U.S. Clean Water Act proclaims that “it is the national goal
that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be
eliminated by 1985” (Clean Water Act [33 USC 1251(a)(1)]),
a goal that obviously has not been met even 25 years later than
planned. The world of environmental and natural resources
policy in developed nations thus is swimming in the stuff of
law, i.e., codes, agencies, litigation, courts, regulations, more
codes, and the sea of legal text keeps swelling. In short, no
new theory of how to do things in environmental and natural
resources management, particularly one that challenges
entrenched ways of doing things and the interests aligned
around them, is likely to gain traction in practice if it cannot
gain traction in the form of endorsement and implementation
through specific laws and regulations.
This is not good news for panarchy theorists. As someone
trained in the law and science of ecosystems, it is my sense—
my very strong sense—that translating and operationalizing
panarchy theory into law will be a very difficult undertaking.
There are two related reasons for my pessimism. First,
dynamic, changing conditions in which uncertainty is high
give law the jitters. The central theme of panarchy theory is
that successfully working with the dynamic forces of complex
adaptive natural and social systems demands an active
adaptive management regime that eschews optimization
approaches seeking stability (Holling et al. 2002). Yet one of
the principal goals of law is to establish and maintain the
relatively stable contexts within which other social systems
(e.g., banking, health care, education, etc.) can operate over
time. This is not to say that law is unchanging or is never the

agent of change in other social systems, but its overall purpose
is to produce more order than chaos.
The second reason panarchy theory may have difficulty
finding a home in law is that law is the emergent product of a
complex adaptive social system: the legal system. The legal
system comprises a multitude of institutions and actors
interacting and evolving over time in ways that give rise to
complex system dynamics (Ruhl 2008). It is hard enough to
get the legal system to produce any particular law, much less
one that manages yet another complex adaptive natural or
social system sustainably over time.
Any effort to operationalize panarchy theory through law thus
comes up against the mission of law to provide social stability
and the nature of law as a complex adaptive system. To state
the problem another way, putting panarchy theory into practice
will require adaptively managing the complex adaptive legal
system to adaptively manage other complex adaptive natural
and social systems, all in a way that maintains some level of
social order. As elaborated below, this will be no mean feat.
Ultimately, however, we may have no choice but to try; thus,
I close with a rally call for lawyers to begin work on the law
of panarchy.
DESIGNING LAW FOR PANARCHY
Panarchy is largely a call for the multi-scalar use of adaptive
management in environmental and natural resources policy.
Today’s voluminous literature on adaptive management traces
its roots to none other than C. S. Holling’s (1978) seminal
work, Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management.
The essence of adaptive management theory is an iterative,
incremental, decision-making process built around a
continuous flow of monitoring the effects of decisions and
adjusting decisions accordingly. As Shapiro and Glicksman
(2002) suggest in their review of regulatory innovations, this
form of decision making allows agencies to learn about and
respond to changing conditions at the “back end” rather than
loading all decision making at the “front end,” when the effects
of decisions and of other changing conditions are not yet
known. This front-end/back-end distinction captures the
essence of adaptive management. The more a program directs
administrative action toward fixing long-term policies and
decisions based on pre-regulatory analysis, the more front-end
it is. Adaptive management requires institutionalization of
monitoring-adjustment frameworks that allow incremental
policy and decision adjustments at the back end, where
performance results can be evaluated and the new information
can be fed back into the ongoing regulatory process. Deliberate
monitoring and a framework for altering course, rapidly and
frequently if conditions warrant, thus are essential ingredients
of adaptive management.
Nothing about this is startlingly new or unusual as a general
means of decision making in complex management
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environments; businesses implement adaptive management
all the time or they perish. However, agencies managing
environmental and natural resources problems are not
businesses, and as a leading proponent of adaptive
management once observed, these agencies “have not often
been rewarded for flexibility, openness, and their willingness
to experiment, monitor, and adapt” (Grumbine 1997). Other
commentators have expressed similar concerns (Iles 1996,
Coleman 1998, Doremus 2001).
The deterrents to implementing adaptive management come
from three fronts: legislatures, the public, and the courts, all
of which have calibrated around the front-end style of decision
making. For adaptive management to flourish in
administrative agencies, legislatures must empower them to
do it, interest groups must let them do it, and the courts must
resist the temptation to second-guess when they do in fact do
it. The track record of administrative law suggests that none
of these three institutional constraints will yield easily to the
back-end approach of adaptive management. Quite simply,
there is good reason to doubt whether regulation by adaptive
management is possible without substantial change in the
deeply entrenched fabric of administrative law (Ruhl 2005,
Garmestani et al. 2008).
Indeed, to anyone familiar with conventional administrative
law, adaptive management sounds nothing like what actually
happens. With broad latitude to delegate legislative power and
processes to administrative agencies, legislatures intending to
regulate behavior through administrative institutions exhibit
a spectrum of approaches from open-ended mandates to
micromanaged authority. However, one truly searches in vain
for legislation that establishes anything like the decisionmaking cycle of adaptive management. Instead, most
administrative agencies increasingly are required to engage in
a tremendous amount of foreplay before promulgating a rule
or adjudicating a decision (Ruhl 2005). Most of this predecisional activity is geared toward serving two goals: public
participation and judicial review. Interest groups enter the
process primarily through notice and comment opportunities,
rights of participation in administrative hearings, and actions
for judicial review of administrative actions. Courts engaging
in such judicial review defer to agencies in many aspects of
substantive outcome, but nonetheless demand thorough
explanations of the rationales for agency decisions, take a hard
look at how the agencies connect the dots, and show little
tolerance for any procedural slips. Truly adaptive management
cannot flourish among regulatory agencies in this
conventional administrative law context.
Yet, as acculturated as legislatures, interest groups, and courts
have become to the front-end style of decision making that
has dominated for decades, few observers believe that this
traditional model will have lasting success as problems such
as invasive species, sprawl, and climate change take hold as

the primary transmitters of environmental policy challenges.
Something has to give. As the National Research Council
Committee studying the Missouri River concluded (National
Research Council 2002:112), adaptive management will
“entail new governance structures.” Ten years later, however,
those new structures have yet to be outlined, much less put
into place as a new form of administrative law for adaptive
management. Hence, problem number one for putting
panarchy theory into practice is how to design a law of adaptive
management that satisfies basic norms of administrative law.
DESIGNING LAW AS PANARCHY
Panarchy also leans heavily on the theory of complex adaptive
systems, i.e., the study of systems comprising a macroscopic,
heterogeneous set of autonomous agents interacting and
adapting in response to one another and to external
environment inputs. Emerging primarily from the physical
sciences in the 1980s, complex adaptive systems theory has
spread to economics (Beinhocker 2006, May et al. 2008),
ecology (Levin 1999), sociology (Sawyer 2005, Miller and
Page 2007), and beyond. A growing number of legal scholars
have begun using complex adaptive systems theory to inform
understanding of legal systems (Hornstein 2005, Ruhl 2008).
Complex adaptive systems theory informs legal design theory
on several levels of contextual depth. At the surface, there are
complex adaptive system properties in the economy, poverty,
war, terrorism, crime, environment, and other realms we
attempt to manage and regulate through law. How should law
be configured so as to best approach these complex social and
physical systems? The answer one derives from panarchy
theory is that law should operationalize adaptive management,
which has its own set of challenges, but one must also look
back at the legal system itself to appreciate the full magnitude
of what panarchy theory demands law deliver, for law is the
product of a complex adaptive system, the legal system (Ruhl
2008).
Why, for example, if the economy and other social systems
exhibit complex adaptive system properties, would not the
legal system? That does not seem plausible. The legal system,
like these other social systems, is a vast collection of
heterogeneous actors and institutions interacting dynamically
over time. To push further, if the economy and the legal system
are both complex adaptive systems, then one would also expect
the two systems to interact in a complex way with each other,
as well as with all the other complex social and physical
systems with which they are interconnected; it has all the
qualities of complex adaptive system evolution. And if law
complexly affects the economy and other systems, and the
economy and other systems complexly affect law, the distinct
probability is that law affects itself complexly. In short, it
defies reason to believe that the legal system would be the one
social world in which the dynamics of complex adaptive
systems are not at work.
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As discussed above, it is difficult enough to conceive of an
administrative law system that accommodates adaptive
management. However, now we see also that any such legal
system, once designed and set in motion must itself be
adaptively managed. Like any complex adaptive system,
whatever decision-making process is designed to implement
adaptive management will be prone to emergent behavior
difficult to have predicted at the start of the decision-making
process and difficult to calibrate over time. Decision makers
faithfully implementing adaptive management according to
its legal text may nonetheless produce results that are volatile
over the short term or which drift far from original conditions
over the long term (Ruhl 2005). In either case, such volatility
or drift could be perfectly appropriate adaptive responses
(Karkkainen 2005) or they could lead to decisions presenting
unintended consequences and substantial policy concerns,
notwithstanding their adaptive pedigree. In other words,
diligent implementation of an adaptive management decisionmaking regime does not necessarily guarantee decisions free
from controversy and defects. Modeling adaptive
management law around panarchy theory could, in fact,
produce results no panarchy theorist would ever want. So, how
do we design law to adaptively manage adaptive management?
The second problem for putting panarchy theory into practice
is that there has yet to be offered an adequate answer to that
question.
CONCLUSION
The contributors to Panarchy may have underestimated the
difficulty of moving from theory to policy to law, but lawyers
should likewise not underestimate the need to make that move.
Change is coming, and legal stasis is unlikely to be the
appropriate response. Panarchy theory offers a compelling
theory of change, one that matches seamlessly with the
problems on environmental law’s horizon. Yet the archaic
front-end system of environmental law decision making stands
little chance when put up against climate change, declining
biodiversity, water scarcity, and the host of other emergent
conditions flowing from the complexity of modern society and
its impacts on the environment (Craig 2010).
Perhaps, in this sense, Panarchy has thrown the ball into the
lawyers’ court. In retrospect, the book’s interdisciplinary team
might have included some legal expertise, but given how much
my analysis has rained on the panarchy parade, a lawyer’s
perspective at that time could have sent everyone home before
the theory got off the ground. Law now has its job cut out for
it: how to take what panarchy theory says about the world and
put it into practice through statutes, regulations, and other hard
law to apply.
I go no further in that effort here than to sound the alarm that
work on the law of panarchy must begin in earnest. In
particular, lawyers must craft a durable administrative law for
adaptive management, one that satisfies norms of stability,

legitimacy, public participation, and judicial review while
truly allowing adaptive management to be adaptive. Other core
concepts of panarchy theory, in particular the precautionary
principle, also must move beyond platitudinal rhetoric and
formless definition to be grounded in real-world problem
contexts such as marine ecosystem management (Craig and
Ruhl 2010).
The lawyers who respond to this rally call, however, must not
resent being left out of the formative stages of panarchy theory.
The law of panarchy will flop if lawyers seal themselves off
from the panarchy theorists to frolic in legalese. Here, more
than ever, an interdisciplinary effort is needed to craft a legal
regime that reflects foundational principles of the motivation
for the intended legal evolution, panarchy theory. Holling,
Gunderson, and their fellow panarchy theorists have
infrequently engaged the law, and lawyers may struggle to
understand what panarchy theory is about, but we must gather
around the same table and break bread. Who is with me?
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss3/art31/
responses/
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